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RIPARIAN ROADBLOCK TO BENEFICIAL USE
Back in the ages when man was first developing concepts of
property rights, it no doubt occurred one day to an enterprising
valley-dweller who had fashioned his hovel on the edge of a
river that he had a valuable commodity which his upland
neighbors lacked-a constant supply of life-giving water. Per-
sumably, from such a revelation the doctrine of riparian rights
developed, an antique system of water law which has survived
unchecked into many present United States jurisdictions.
Basically, the riparian system bestows on the freeholder con-
tiguous to a stream a batch of rights not enjoyed by landlocked
titleholders. A riparian owner is entitled to the continuance of
the flow of the stream by his property, undiminished in quan-
tity or quality. The riparian does not own the water in the
stream, but he is entitled to the beneficial use of such waters,
as long as the use is reasonable and he returns the unused por-
tion to the watercourse.'
Part of the riparian doctrine is the concept that a riparian
proprietor, though he can divert the water to his own purposes,
cannot divert it beyond the watershed drained by the stream.
Theoretically, this rule is based on the assumption that all the
water diverted into the watershed will eventually return to the
watercourse, thus fulfilling the right of the lower riparian to
have the stream undiminished in quantity.2 While the factual
basis for this hypothesis may be doubtful, the theory is still
strong enough to support this corollary.
Thus, it may be seen that the riparian doctrine eventually
boils down to a battle between the "haves" and the "have nots"
-the "haves" being the riparian owners who can use the water
within the watershed, and the "have nots" being the landowners
beyond the watershed with a need for water resources.
The watershed limitation doctrine has been frequently at-
tacked as being impractical in an age when abundant, relatively
pure water is already rare and becoming more so. Why should
a riparian farmer be able to use river water almost to abandon
to cool down his hogs, while the parched residents of the city
1. 93 C.J.S. Waters § 9 (1956).
2. Id. §§ 58-62.
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over the hill thirst for an adequate water supply? This article
will attempt to explore the legal foundation for such inequities
and some of the approaches that have been taken within the law
for dealing with the outdated restriction.
I. BASES FOR TBE LimTATIoN
The doctrine that water diverted from a watercourse must be
retained within the watershed presents fundamental questions
that go to the conceptual foundation of the riparian system.
The first inquiry would seem to be, "How will 'watershed' be
defined?" but a more basic question must first be considered-
"Who are riparian owners?"
The general rules as to who are riparians have been expressed
thus:
Riparian rights are appurtenant only to lands which
actually touch on the watercourse or through which it
flows, not to any lands physically separated from the
stream, although belonging to the same owner; and one
who owns land bordering on a stream may not enlarge
the area of his "riparian" property by the acquisition
of lands adjacent to those first owned, although not
themselves contiguous to the stream, but separate tracts
under separate patents based on separate entry, al-
though contiguous to a tract bordering on a stream, do
not give riparian rights to the simple owner, nor can
the rights be made to extend beyond the natural water-
shed of the stream.
There are various definitions of what is riparian land. One
is called the "source of title" test, which is concerned with the
devolution of riparian property from one owner to the next.
Another is the "unity of title" rule, which defines riparian land
as all that portion of a tract held in a single title contiguous
to the watercourse. Neither of these two definitions is con-
cerned with the watershed limitation. But the general defini-
tion of riparian land combines the "unity of title" test with the
requirement that the land lie in the watershed of the water-
course.
4
For those landowners who are found to meet such a defini-
tion, special rights attach:
3. Id. § 8.
4. Waite, Beneficial Use of Water in a Riparian Jurisdiction, 1969 Wisc.
L. REv. 864, 872-73, hereinafter cited as Waite.
[Vol.23
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Each riparian proprietor is entitled to have the water-
course flow by or through his land in its natural course,
quantity, and quality, subject only to reasonable use by
other proprietors. lie, in turn, is entitled to make use
of the water in the stream while on his land in any way
he sees fit, provided that he does not by such use unrea-
sonably affect the right of an upper or lower riparian
proprietor. The nine common law states in the South-
east seem to follow this general rule.5
Of course, the riparian proprietor can divert the flow of a
stream while it is on his land, so long as he returns it to the
lower riparian proprietors through the natural channel. 6 But
returning the surplus water to the natural channel is a most
vital part of the rule-if the riparian cannot return it, then he
must not divert it.7
South Carolina first set out its adherence to the riparian doc-
trine in the 1835 case of Omelvany v. Jaggers.8 The court
adopted the position that
the possessor of lands through which a natural stream
runs, has a right to the advantage of the stream flow-
ing in its natural course, and to use it as he pleases, and
for any purposes of his own not inconsistent with a
similar right of the proprietors of the land above and
below; . . . and that whether loss by the diversion of
the general benefit of such a stream, be or be not such
an injury in point of law as to sustain an action with-
out some special damage, yet as soon as the proprietor
of the land has applied to it some purpose of utility, or
is prevented from so doing by the diversion, he has a
right of action against the person diverting.9
The court, adopting language from Kent's Commentaries,
also laid down the general rule against diversion from the
watershed:
Though [a proprietor] may use the water while it runs
over his land, he cannot reasonably [sic] detain it or
give it another direction, and he must return it to its
ordinary channel when it leaves his estate. Without the
5. Agnor, Riparia Rights in the Southeastern States, 5 S.C.L.Q. 141, 143
(1952).
6. Id. at 144-45.
7. 93 CJ.S. Waters § 62 (1956).
8. 2 Hill 634 (S.C. 1835).
9. Id. at 638-39.
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consent of the adjoining proprietors, he cannot divert
or diminish the quantity of water which would other-
wise descend to the proprietors below, nor throw back
upon the proprietors above, without a grant .... 10
Thus, according to traditional riparian doctrine, accepted in
South Carolina and most of the eastern states, the stream water
may be used only upon riparian land, and riparian land em-
braces only the land within the watershed. Such a limitation is
consistent with the principle that a riparian owner's rights to
use stream water are not limited to his existing uses, but include
future uses as well. As one article has noted, "The watershed
limitation is thus merely a means of protecting the riparian
rights of others, by tending to make return flow available if
needed in the future.""1
But how to define a watershed? The dictionary approach is
"a whole region or area contributing to the supply of a river or
lake," but this has been criticized as too simple. The practical
difficulties involved in ascertaining the physical limits of a
watershed include the problem of flat areas in the middle and
upper reaches of rivers, where the flat areas can be included
within a river basin by only faint topographic indication. Simi-
lar flat areas in coastal plains between rivers are also almost
impossible to categorize in either one's basin.1 2
But such faint topographic dividers are vital to the issue at
hand, for it is not hard to imagine that one large riparian tract
may lie in more than one watershed:
Suppose that a large single tract of land touches a
stream. This tract has riparian rights in the stream,
but the question remains as to whether the entire tract
is entitled to be benefitted thereby. There appears to be
a distinction between land outside the watershed of the
stream and land within the watershed. Land within
the watershed of a stream is riparian land, while land
outside the watershed of the stream is considered to be
non-riparian land, even though it is contiguous to ri-
parian land.13
10. Id. at 640. The later case of White v. Whitney Mfg. Co., 60 S.C. 254,
38 S.E. 456 (1901), which relied on the Omelvany case, noted that the word
"reasonably" in the above quotation was a misprint, and the word should have
been "unreasonably."
11. Johnson and Knippa, Transbasin Diversion of Water, 43 TmxAs L. Rav.
1035, 1036 (1965), hereinafter cited as Johnson and Knippa.
12. Id. at 1049.
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Thus, the definition of a watershed is largely fulfilled by
the geographical contour of the land involved. But another
aspect of the watershed definition arises when there are several
streams in one area, some of which may be tributaries of other
streams. Then the question of where one watershed stops and
another begins becomes more complex. The question is answered
by considering where the man is who is doing the complaining.
The cases involving the riparian watershed limitation
show that the meaning of the term for that purpose de-
pends upon the nature of the controversy. A transfer
of water from one tributary to another tributary of
the same major stream is beyond the watershed if com-
plained of by a riparian located on the originating
tributary; but such a transfer is deemed to be within
the watershed (of the main stream) and thus lawful
if the only complaining riparians are located down-
stream from the point of confluence of the two trib-
utaries.14
The same concept has been expressed in a 1969 Wisconsin
Law Review article:
Under any definition of riparian land, the watershed
is defined with reference to each riparian tract of land.
The watershed definition has two elements. First, the
land within the watershed must be drained by the
watercourse. Second, once the water the land supplies
is in the watercourse, it must flow by the particular
tract of riparian land whose watershed is in question.
Thus only the riparian tract at the mouth of the water-
course would have a watershed comprising all the land
drained by a watercourse. And a riparian whose land
is located below a stream junction has not experienced
a transfer out of the watershed when water is trans-
ferred from one of the stream branches to land drained
by the other.
1 5
Though this concept of watersheds and tributary streams
seems well accepted now, such was not always the case. The
issue was best considered in a California case in 1938, Ranchc
Santa Margarita v. Vail.'6 Because the case was so intimately
14. Johnson and Knippa, supra note 9, at 1049.
15. Waite, mipra note 2, at 872 (fn).
16. 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P2d 533 (1938). The action was brought in 1924,
maling 14 years until final decision was rendered. The record printed for
review filled eleven printed volumes, supplemented with four volumes of
5
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concerned with the issue of watersheds, it is worth close con-
sideration in connection with this article.
The plaintiff sued for an adjudication of water rights of the
Temecula-Santa Margarita River and its tributaries, and to
enjoin the defendants from interfering with its flow. The trial
court found for the plaintiff, holding that it was entitled to
75% of the flow. On appeal, the issue was the definition of a
watershed as to a riparian owner downstream from where two
converging streams join. Stated differently, the question was,
as to such a downstream owner, are lands located within the
drainage area of a tributary within the watershed of the main
stream?
The court reviewed three criteria for land having riparian
status: (1) It must be contiguous to or abut on the stream. (2)
The riparian right extends only to the smallest tract held under
one title in the chain of title leading to the present owner. (3)
The land, in order to be riparian, must be within the watershed
of the stream.17
The defendant's upstream tract bordered both on the Teme-
cula-Santa Margarita River and on Murrieta Creek, a tributary,
although most of the tract in question was within the Murrieta
watershed. The plaintiff's land surrounded the Temecula-Santa
Margarita at the site of its mouth at the Pacific Ocean: The
defendant contended that all of its land was riparian to the
Temecula-Santa Margarita as against the plaintiff, a down-
stream riparian, regardless of the fact that the major portion
of the area was within the creek's drainage area. The court
agreed to the defendant's theory that "as to any owner below
the confluence of two branches of a stream, the drainage areas
of both branches must be deemed to constitute a single water-
shed, where riparian land .. . is owned by the upper owner on
both branches."'
The factual issue was whether the defendant could divert
water from the main stream into the watershed of the tributary.
Quoting from an earlier California case, the court said:
exhibits. The cause was in the trial court for three years, consuming 444
actual court days. The appellate briefs of the parties totalled over 2,000 pages.
The case fills 33 pages in the Pacific reporter, with 52 headnotes.
17. 81 P2d at 547. There seems to be some doubt that South Carolina
would follow the second part of the rule regarding necessity of continuance of
title. Lecture of Prof. Charles Randall, Sept. 23, 1969, University of South
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Both watersheds are but parts of the watershed of the
stream as it passes the plaintiffs' lands, and the rule
that the owner of a tract of riparian land may not con-
vey and use the water without the watershed of the
stream has no application. The water is not conveyed
and used without the watershed of the stream which
passes the plaintiffs' lands, and that stream is the
stream in which the plaintiffs have rights. They have
no rights in the main stream and the branch above as
separate streams.19
The court concluded, "This constitutes a direct and unequivocal
holding that as to riparian lands downstream from the con-
fluence the two branches constitute but one watershed.1
20
The Vail case distinguished another earlier California case,
Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller.21 In that case the defend-
ant owned two tracts of land, one on the main river and another
on a tributary. Plaintiff's land was below defendant's on the
main river, but above the point where the tributary joined. The
plaintiff sued when defendant diverted water from the main
stream for use on his tract within the watershed of the tribu-
tary. Obviously, the diverted water would thus by-pass the
plaintiff's land. The court held that, where two streams unite,
with regard to lands abutting thereon above the junction, the
drainage area of each stream is a separate watershed. Quoting
from Fuller, the Fail case explained the reasoning for the
watershed limitation rule:
The principal reasons for the rule confining riparian
rights to the part of lands bordering on the stream
which are within the watershed are that, where the
water is used on such land, it will, after such use, re-
turn to the stream, so far as it is not consumed, and
that, as the rainfall on such lands feeds the stream,
the land is in consequence entitled, so to speak, to the
use of its waters. Where two streams unite, we think
the correct rule to be applied, in regard to the riparian
rights therein, is that each is to be considered a sepa-
rate stream, with regard to lands abutting thereon
above the junction, and the land lying within the
watershed of one stream above that point is not to be
19. Id. at 548.
20. Id.
21. 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978 (1907).
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considered as riparian to the other stream. The fact
that the streams are of different size, or that both lie
in one general watershed, or drainage basin, should not
affect the rule .... 22
Thus, the Vail23 case held that, as to the plaintiff, all of the
defendant's riparian lands within the Murrieta drainage area
are within the watershed of and are riparian to the Temecula-
Santa Margarita, reversing the trial court on this point. The
court succinctly summed up the entire controversy in one sen-
tence: "It is the situation of land within the watershed that is
material."
24
The riparian system, in the states where it is in force, thus
serves as an effective means of protecting the interests of those
fortunate enough to reside within a bountiful watershed. In
many of the western states, where water is more scarce, the
riparian system has been junked in favor of the more modern
prior appropriation system. Though such jurisdictions may
scoff at those clinging to the antique reparian rules, many
appropriation states have not been hesitant to adopt watershed-
protection legislation, thus guarding by statute that which is
protected by the common law in riparian states. Such legisla-
tion is necessary to protect watershed landowners' interests, for
the prior appropriation doctrine rejects the limitation of water
use to the watershed.2 5
Nebraska, a state which combines both an appropriations and
riparian rights system, is one state which has placed statutory
restrictions on transbasin diversion. In Osterman v. Central
Nebraska Public Power and Iirrigation District,20 the court con-
strued the statute to bar transbasin diversions in all cases, "even
where benefits to the receiving region would clearly outweigh
the detriment suffered by the originating basin."27 This de-
cision was later essentially nullified by a 1960 case, Ainworth
Irigation District v. Bejot,23 which seemed to say a diversion
was not a transbasin one since the diversion was from one river
which was tributary to another, to which the water would be
diverted. Nevertheless, it may be seen that such statutes may be
22. 81 P.2d 549; emphasis by the court.
23. Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P.2d 533 (193S).
24. Id. at 81 P.2d 550.
25. Johnson and Knippa, supra note 9, at 1037.
26. 131 Neb. 356, 268 N.W. 334 (1936).
27. Johnson and Knippa, supra note 9, at 1039.
28. 170 Neb. 257, 102 N.W.2d 416 (1960).
[Vol. 23
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even more stringent in keeping the water in the watershed than
the common law riparian doctrine. Such a result has been
soundly criticized: "The Nebraska experience demonstrates, if
demonstration be needed, the lack of wisdom, and indeed the
futility, of attempting to deal with the problem of transbasin
diversion by a blanket statutory prohibition." 29
Colorado is an appropriation state which straddles the Con-
tinental Divide. There a statute effected the policy that a
transbasin diversion should be allowed only as to the excess
water above the present and future needs of the originating
basins for consumptive uses. This so-called watershed-of-origin
statute applied only to water-conservation districts, so it would
not affect transbasin diversions that did not rely on such dis-
tricts. Such an act, in an appropriation state, may be vulnerable
to constitutional attack. There is some indication that the policy
may be the result of the political power of United States con-
gressmen representing the comparatively water-rich districts on
the western slope of the Continental Divide.30
In populous California, the problem is one of water maldistri-
bution. There the threat to originating basins has been main-
fested in both county-of-origin and watershed-protection stat-
utes. The state attorney general construed the latter act to
entitle the residents of the protected areas to future appropria-
tions of water, even if it would be necessary to recapture water
already appropriated for use outside the watershed. This stat-
ute, and the general problem of reconciling the interests of
originating and receiving regions, became the subject of an in-
tense controversy when the Feather River project, which would
move vast quantities of water from northern California to the
southern part of the state, was proposed. Such legislation has
also been questioned in light of the California constitutional
mandate that water be put to the fullest extent of beneficial
use. The Feather River project was given final approval only
after the inclusion of a provision for the construction of local
projects in originating areas.31
Texas has enacted a so-called watershed-prejudice statute,
which makes it illegal to divert water from one watershed to
another "to the prejudice of any person or property situated
within the watershed from which such water is proposed to be
29. Johnson and Knippa, supra note 9, at 1039.
30. Id. at 1040-42.
31. Id. at 1042-44.
1971]
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taken or diverted.13 2 The legislative purpose here may have
been not only to protect the holders of water rights, but also
others located in the originating basin who benefit from the
flow of the stream, such as businessmen serving farmers en-
gaged in irrigation. The term "prejudice" in the statute proba-
bly implies a balancing situation, where benefits and detri-
ments expected to result from the proposed transbasin diversion
would be compared, and prejudice found only if the detriments
outweigh the benefits. The Texas statute differs from the
California legislation in that it does not imply that the future
needs of the originating basin can be met by recapturing water
diverted elsewhere.
33
A 1965 Texas statute put a fifty-year limitation on planning
for transbasin diversion. Called the "fifty-year lockup" by
critics, the limitation was the result of apprehension by the in-
habitants of eastern Texas, and was intended to assure originat-
ing areas of sufficient water for their anticipated needs. The
provision thus creates a preference for intrabasin needs. Such
a policy may clash with the Texas priority-of-use statute-a
municipality, which is given the first priority, may be shut out
from getting water from an adjacent watershed.3 4
IH. DEALING WITH THE LMITATION
With the deck stacked against widespread use of water re-
sources by the riparian doctrine in some states and watershed-
protection statutes in others, how can the water be legally
transferred from the watershed "haves" to the dryland "have-
nots"? Solutions have been attempted, both by the federal gov-
ernment at the planning level, and by state governments with
specific legislation.
It first may be noted that there is apparently no clear federal
policy on the protection of watersheds-of-origin. True, restric-
tive provisions have been incorporated into particular federal
projects in some instances, but this may be due to the political
power of the affected areas. Federal agencies generally seem
to give deference to state policy on the protection of the water
supply. The recent Water Resources Planning Act of 196535
contained a disclaimer that the legislation gave any authority
for recommending transfer of waters between river basins.3 6
32. TEx. PENAL CODE art. 842 (1961).
33. Johnson and Knippa, supra note 9, at 1044-48.
34. Id. at 1052.
35. Pub. L. No. 80, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., July 22, 1965.
36. Johnson and KNippa, supra note 9, at 1054-55.
(Vol. 23
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But federal involvement in water matters begins at a level
even more basic than the watershed. The broadly-construed
federal navigation power includes rivers navigable in fact, those
navigable with reasonable improvements, non-navigable por-
tions of a navigable waterway, and non-navigable tributaries.
Thus, as a corollary to the navigation power, the government
claims a dominant servitude over the land on which such water-
ways flow. Under this theory, there can be no compensation for
water rights lost as the result of federal diversion, because no
property has been taken to which the federal government did
not already have a right.37
Federal primacy in stream waters is further supported by the
rule that there is no such thing as "ownership" of the water in
a navigable stream.38 Thus the federal government owes no
compensation for taking the running water in a navigable
stream, since it is owned by no one. Compensation is given, if
at alln, only for physical damage to the lands contiguous to the
stream.39 But it is unlikely that the federal government would
have to compensate for even such damage to adjacent lands:
[T]he extent and nature of rights to water based on the
ownership of riparian lands is governed exclusively by
the law of the state in which the riparian land lies.
The federal government, however, under the commerce
clause, has the power to utilize the water without pay-
ing compensation for the impairment of water rights
recognized by the state law, including the impairment
of the strictly riparian value of the adjoining lands
(the value solely due to the existence of the govern-
ment owned running water) .... It is only when the
United States alters some water right on the navigable
mainstream of a river that it is immune from such pay-
ment.
4 0
Thus, although a state can prevent waters from a wholly
intrastate stream from being exported to another state,41 the
37. Comment, Problems in Interbasin Water Transfer, 1 CAUF. W. L.
REv. 136, 140 (1965), hereinafter cited as Comment.
38. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53
(1913), held that ownership of water flowing in a navigable stream is "in-
conceivable."
39. Comment, sutpra note 33, at 141.
40. Id., citing United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
41. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908). This would
appear to be in accord with the traditional claim of state governments to the
right to retain natural resources within their boundaries. Johnson and Knippa,
supra note 9, at 1056.
11
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federal government still retains the right to transport the water
of interstate streams, or of navigable streams lying wholly
within a state, under the general power to regulate commerce.42
Although the federal government could conceptually siphon
water from any sizable watershed in the nation and transfer it
to another, without fear of compensating injured riparians or
prior appropriators, such an approach would probably be too
grandiose for even the most power-conscious administration to
take. More practically, federal involvement is more likely to
attach at the planning level. Such regional planning would
effect the transportation of water from areas of abundance to
areas of need. Naturally, areas with plentiful water supplies
would view such a scheme with alarm, but proponents of
federal planning contend that recognition of the prior rights of
the area of origin can be made in the form of benefits, such
as power and flood control projects or aid to intrastate water
programs.43
The very scale of the problem of interbasin transfer would
seem to suggest the desirability of federal regional planning, for
the federal government is not limited by jurisdictional bounda-
ries or geographical areas. But still the conflict devolves into
one between the "haves" and the "have-nots," and one writer
has pragmatically predicted that the outcome will be the result
of that ultimate settler of accounts, political power:
The feasibility of regional planning depends upon the
willingness of the individual states to accept future
benefits for present detriments. Political power, there-
fore, will be a determining factor in making a particu-
lar regional plan desirable from the standpoint of the
states involved and may even equalize the time factor
by forcing the giving of a greater future benefit in ex-
change for a lesser present detriment. In any event,
each state can seek any type of benefit it could con-
ceivably desire as consideration for its participation.
The quantity and quality of the consideration is limited
only by the extent of the political power of the state.
44
42. Comment, supra note 33, at 142. As to the allocation of water rights
in interstate streams, this is usually accomplished by (1) a suit between two
states under article III of the Constitution, (2) a compact between the states
under article 1, section 10, or (3) judicial interpretation of a federal act,
as was done in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). Id. at 137.
43. Id. at 148.
44. Id. at 149.
[Vol. 3
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State governments, however, have no such constitutional bless-
ing as the navigation clause to exert power over their waters,
and thus the states must search for other means for providing
for a beneficial distribution of water without subjecting them-
selves or their subdivisions to liability to riparians or prior
appropriators. Of course, such objections could be silenced by
the purchase or condemnation of such rights,45 but few state
governments could afford to pay the price for such action.
Therefore, the states have sought other ploys for eluding the
restriction. The usual approach is through legislation, but such
a solution is not without its pitfalls:
State legislatures might alter the common law and
allow [transbasin] diversions for consumptive beneficial
uses, but legislative solutions may be delayed or pre-
vented by groups preferring that water remain in
watercourses. New statutes also invite litigation of
their constitutionality.46
One approach is to distinguish regular stream flow from
flood waters. Some riparian states permit public impounding
of water "in excess of existing reasonable uses." 47 Under this
theory, riparians have no rights to such increased flowage, and
such water is thus freed from the riparian doctrine. The ripar-
ian roadblock swept away by the flood, the water may be then
used at any place and for any purpose contemplated by the
statute.4
8
Texas, a. state which employs a combined riparian-prior
appropriation system, is one jurisdiction which has tried the
flood water approach. There the riparian rights are limited to
"normal flow" and do not attach to "storm and flood waters."
Thus reservoirs, which provide the source of water for inter-
basin transfer, can be conceptually fitted into the "storm and
flood water" category. 49 The state supreme court seemed to
affirm the distinction in a 1927 decision, Texas Co. v. Burkett.5 °
That case held that, while, as a general rule, a riparian owner
had no right to divert riparian water to non-riparian land, he
might do so when water is abundant and no possible injury
could result to lower riparian owners. The court concluded that
45. Johnson and Knippa, mtpra note 9, at 1038.
46. Waite, .supra note 2, at 864.
47. IND. Anx. STAT. § 27-1403 (2) (1960).
48. Waite, supra note 2, at 869.
49. Johnson and Knippa, supra note 9, at 1037.
50. 117 Ten. 16, 296 S.W. 273 (1927). An annotation on this point may
be found at 54 A.L.R. 1411 (1928).
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only a prejudicial diversion of water was prohibited by the state
statutes.
But the flood-water approach still seems to go against the
grain of the riparian doctrine, which is not only concerned with
the present right to the stream's flow, but also unimpaired
future rights:
Traditional doctrine entitles the riparian to commence
making actual reasonable use of the water anytime in
the future. Possibly permitting water to be diverted
from a stream, thereby reducing the flow of water
passing riparian land downstream from the point of
diversion is such a reduction of riparian rights as to be
a taking of property, even though, at the time the di-
version permit is issued, the downstream riparian is not
actually using the stream. The same possibility is pres-
ent in situations where the downstream riparian is
actually using the stream, but the use is not affected
by the diversion."'
Indiana, a riparian state, has tried a contract approach. A
statute authorizes the use of contractual arrangements to pro-
vide minimum quantities of stream flow or to provide water
to purchasers. The contracts have a fifty-year limitation and
are loosely restricted to "uses and needs in a manner consistent
with the public interest."5 2 The water used to fulfil such con-
tracts is taken from state-financed reservoirs,"3 which are prob-
ably supplied by the excess-water doctrine.
Another method of combating the watershed limitation doc-
trine is the permit approach. In Wisconsin, a riparian state,
there has been no move to adopt a state-administered water use
permit system. But the state Public Service Commission was
given power to permit water diversion for the purpose of re-
storing normal lake and stream levels when lowered by drought
and for purposes of agriculture or irrigation. The commission
construed the granting legislation to mean that it had the power
to determine whether a proposed diversion would injure ripar-
ians already making a beneficial use of the water, and thus
require their consent before diversion might be permitted. The
Wisconsin supreme court did not see it that way. In a 1959
51. Waite, spra note 2, at 870.
52. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1407 (10) (Supp. 1968).
53. Waite, supra note 2, at 867-68.
[Vol. 2,3
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case,5 4 the court held that if water is being used beneficially,
its diversion is per se harmful to a riparian, and under the
statute his consent is required. In other words, the commission
could not arbitrarily determine whether or not a diversion
would be harmful to a riparian making use of the flow. The
decision may have been prompted by a feeling that the com-
mission was indeed acting arbitrarily in its program of water
use control. 5
But a water use permit system in a riparian jurisdiction
raises the question as to whether riparians along the affected
watercouse must be compensated for not receiving the water
delivered to the state-authorized user. Constitutionally, the
question must be answered by determining whether the particu-
lar deprivation is a "taking" by the government of riparian
property rights. If so, compensation must be paid.56
Bino v. City of Hurley,57 a Wisconsin decision, suggests that
the crucial question for compensation purposes is whether a
particular riparian right has been eliminated. In that case, the
city tried to protect the purity of its water by prohibiting
bathing, boating, and swimming in the lake which was the
city's water supply. A riparian owner successfully challenged
the prohibition as a taking of his property without compensa-
tion. The court described the riparian right as "a substantial
and valuable one for which compensation must be given if the
owner is to be deprived of it." Though this case does not in-
volve the question of a permit, it demonstrates the high regard
riparian state courts afford to riparian rights. Devising a
permit system which would not bankrupt the state by indemni-
fying injured riparians will be a most difficult problem.
Any state system employing the excess water, contract, or
permit approach for spiriting water away from the strong
riparian grasp contemplates that the water so salvaged will be
put to public use. This use in itself meets a separate riparian
hurdle. For the ultimate question under the riparian system is
whether the use of the flow is reasonable, and not whether it is
in the public interest. As one writer has noted, "The sense of
public use associated with exercise of public rights in water-
courses seems alien to riparianism . ,,.5 Further, it has spe-
54. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 8 Wisc. 2d
582, 99 N.W2d 821 (1959).
55. Waite, supra note 2, at 865-66.
56. Id. at 868.
57. 273 Wisc. 10, 76 N.W2d 571 (1956).
58. Waite, supra note 2, at 878.
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cifically been held that to take the flow of a stream to supply
water for the inhabitants of a town was a violation of the rights
of the lower riparians, especially where the water was being
used on non-riparian land.59
A 1951 Maine case, Kennebun, Kennebun1kport and WeZls
Water District v. Maine Turnpike Authority,0 indicates that
riparian courts look with disfavor on public use as against
riparian rights. There the turnpike authority bought a right-
of-way and constructed a roadway across a brook. The water
district brough suit to recover damages for injury to its water
supply, because the construction had created a turbid condition
of the water. The court held that, where the water district did
not by purchase, prescription, grant or eminent domain acquire
-as against the turnpike authority, which was an upper ripar-
ian proprietor-the right to use waters as a source of supply for
public distribution, the turnpike authority could proceed with
construction even though it created the turbid condition in the
brook. The court did not mince words:
If control of the watershed of a stream for the purpose
of protecting its water supply be desired by a water
company or water district, it should be acquired by
purchase, or . . . by the exercise of eminent domain.
It cannot, as against upper proprietors, be acquired by
a prescriptive use of the water for such purpose.01
The court's further language seemed to condemn any type of
public use which could injure riparian rights:
The use of water for public distribution in this State
is a non-riparian use, and a use of the water by the
plaintiff which cannot be a factor in determining as
between the plaintiff and the defendant whether or not
the use by the defendant of its upper riparian land is a
reasonable use.62
Thus, the court indicated that since the water district was
not making a riparian use of the water, it lacked standing to
challenge the turnpike authority's use as being unreasonable.
Seemingly, the turnpike authority could muddy the water supply
with impunity as long as it wished. Such holdings indicate the
59. Agnor, Riparian Rights in the Southeastern States, 5 S.C.L.Q. 141, 145
(1952).
60. 147 Me. 149, 84 A2d 433 (1951).
61. Id. at 154, 84 A2d at 438.
62. Id. at 155, 84 A2d at 439.
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practical impossibility of planning for large scale public water
use in any riparian jurisdiction.
South Carolina, a riparian state, has been blessed with an
abundant water supply, so the problems of water supply which
have plagued some of the drier states have not arisen in this
state. But with increased population and industrialization, it
is doubtful that South Carolina's carefree cavorting with its
plentiful water can survive far into the future.
The only statutory enactments in this area have been local
legislation dealing with particularized situations. The acts,
concerned mostly with municipal water supply, seem uncon-
cerned that public use is not a proper riparian use. Some of the
acts specifically recognize the right of riparians to the water
being diverted, and inferentially allow suit to be brought
against the diverting municipality. But because the state's
water supply is so abundant, the issue apparently has not been
raised.
One such South Carolina act authorizes the city of Walter-
boro to divert eight per cent of the flow of the Edisto River
from a point near the river's junction with U.S. Highway 15,
almost due north of Walterboro. The statute enables the city to
impound the water and distribute it through the municipal
water system.63 Provision is made for the use of the power of
eminent domain to procure rights of way for transporting the
water,64 but apparently not for condemning lower riparian
rights. Indeed, one section of the act provides, "This article
shall not affect the right of any person to recover . . . damages
sustained as a result of the diversion of the waters permitted
by this article," 5 and another part recognizes, "Nothing con-
tained in this article shall prevent any riparian owner of lands,
either above or below the point of diversion, to use the waters
of the Edisto River for irrigation and for other agriculture
purposes."(0 Apparently water is so plentiful in the low country
that Walterboro can siphon away eight per cent of the Edisto
without fear of suit from injured riparians.
A 1963 amendment to the Walterboro legislation gave all of
that city's rights of diversion to Colleton County as well.67
That amendment contained a proviso that the Colleton-Walter-
63. S.C. CODE AN . § 70-471 (1962).
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 70-473 (1962).
65. S.C. CODE ANN. § 70-477 (1962).
66. S.C. CODE ANN. § 70-478 (1962).
67. S.C. CODE ANN. § 70-475.1 (Supp. 1969).
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boro diversion "shall not interfere with the commissioners of
public works of the city of Charleston obtaining eighty million
gallons per day through the two existing intakes at Givhans.1'' 8
Charleston, of course, is either in the watershed of the Ashley or
Cooper rivers; yet this amendment takes notice of the fact that
Charleston draws eighty million gallons of water a day from a
point at least thirty miles from the city and entirely within a
separate watershed.
Another group of local statutes69 deals with the Bushy
Park Authority in Berkeley and Charleston counties. The func-
tion of the authority is to impound fresh water flowing down
the Cooper River for distribution to industrial and domestic
uses within its service area, though it is not to compete with
the city of Charleston's public works commission. The author-
ity is specifically authorized to divert water from the Cooper
River to the Back River, and to construct dams on the Back
River to impound the water.70 Presumably such a diversion is
still within the Cooper watershed, but while the watershed ob-
jection is not raised, the question of using riparian water for
public use is still presented.
Various other South Carolina acts empower scattered munici-
palities with questionable rights of diversion. Newberry is
authorized to divert water from the Saluda River for municipal
purposes.7 1  In Florence County, the Ebenezer Community
Watershed Conservation District is authorized to divert water
from Middle Swamp, 72 and the Polk Swamp Watershed Con-
servation District is empowered to divert water from Black
Creek for use within the district.73 One article permits the
International Paper Company at Georgetown to divert one
hundred cubic feet of water per second per day from the Great
Pee Dee River. The authorized point of diversion is above the
point where the Great Pee Dee and the Little Pee Dee unite to
form the Pee Dee, which has its mouth in Georgetown's Winyah
Bay. The act provides that the company "shall obtain all neces-
sary rights of way from the landowners concerned, from and
including the point of diversion to the point of use at the plant
in Georgetown," but again this provision is apparently con-
68. Id.
69. S.C. CODE AN;. §§ 70-391 et. seq. (1962).
70. S.C. CODE ANN. § 70-397 (8) (1962).
71. S.C. CODE ANN. § 70-491 (1962).
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 70-411 (1962).
73. S.C. CODE ANN. § 70-412 (1962).
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cerned with the rights of way for canals, pipelines, and ditches
to transport the water, and not with riparian rights. Other
provisos in the act provide that any person may recover dam-
ages sustained as a result of the diversion, and that riparian
owners shall not be prevented from using the Pee Dee waters
for irrigation and agricultural purposes. 74  Apparently, the
company is willing to take that risk.
1I. 'CONUSIO
Putting aside the riparian and statutory limitations placed
on transfer of water out of the watershed, what preference
should rationally be given to originating basins? First to be
determined is whether the physical characteristics of the water-
shed justify the retention of stream flow within the watershed.
Many writers question the appropriateness of the watershed as
a proper unit for usage planning. Since there is a natural
equilibrium between surface and ground waters caused by the
charging of ground water into streams in time of surface slack,
a watershed is not necessarily isolated from the adjacent water-
shed. Ground water aquifers cause natural interbasin transfer.75
The nature of intrabasin interests which are protected are not
only the legally-guarded water rights, but other benefits eco-
nomically related. Thus, there should be a comparison of intra-
basin benefits with the benefits to be derived from diversion.
As one authority has noted, "It would be folly for a state to
jettison a transbasin project of vast importance to the economy
of the state in order to assure the continued solvency of a hand-
ful of intrabasin businessmen.1 76  Further, "When a water
project is involved, there is the added risk that projection of
future needs of the originating basin will cause waste of water
until such time as those needs develop."
77
So a balancing of interests doctrine would seem to answer all
interests best. Then, a proposed transbasin diversion would be
rejected for the sake of intrabasin interests only if the benefits
from protecting such interests are more important to the state
than the benefits to be derived from the project. For transbasin
diversion in itself is neither good nor bad, and the merits of
each case should be determined on a project-to-project basis.
74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 70-481 (1962).
75. Johnson and Knippa, sutra note 9, at 1058.
76. Id. at 1059.
77. Id. at 1060.
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"What is needed is machinery which will provide for thorough
consideration of interests both inside and outside the basin of
origin and set up as a standard for decision the welfare of the
entire state."78 In a state with a comprehensive water plan and
a competent water administrative agency, there is no need for
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